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Critical Notices
Michael Boudreau* Justice or Repression?: Canadian
State Trials and the Rule of Law
[Review of F.M. Greenwood & B. Wright, eds., Canadian State Trials, Volume I:
Law, Politics and Security Measures, 1608-1837 (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1996)]
In a letter to Deputy Judge Advocate Charles Gould, dated 10 April 1762,
General Thomas Gage, Commander-in-Chief of British forces in North
America, wrote with regard to the proceedings of the general courts
martial in Montreal that "it is a Maxim held by all Civilians That no
government can subsist without Law."' Over half a century later in Bay
Roberts, Newfoundland, William Elenes filed an affidavit with the
Harbour Grace Sessions Court alleging that a group of men stole some
potatoes from his house. "Late in March of [ 1817]," the statement read,
"John McGrath with a gun and two men came to [Elenes'] house asking
for potatoes. Twenty-one or 22 men armed with guns and sticks stood a
short distance off." According to Elenes, he told McGrath that "I had no
potatoes on my own room but what my own family required." Elenes then
asked McGrath if he "had any authority for acting as he was doing and
why a Constable had not come with him." McGrath apparently replied
that "they were authority enough.., and had no need of a Constable."
These men then proceeded to take two barrels of potatoes, but after Elenes
had protested they took only one barrel. When Elenes tried to thwart their
efforts for a second time, "one of the gang seized me by the throat and
would have strangled me but for the assistance of my wife."2
These two seemingly disparate episodes in the colonial history of
British North America underscore the paradox inherent in the rule of law.
The rule of law organizes social relations by embedding within civil
society a framework of authority to which everyone is bound to adhere.
In conjunction with the state, the law maintains a social order character-
* Department of History, University of Prince Edward Island.
1. F.M. Greenwood & B. Wright, eds., Canadian State Trials, Volume I: Law, Politics and
Security Measures, 1608-1837 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996) at 622 [hereinaf-
ter State Trials].
2. Ibid., at 648-649.
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ized by domination and class conflict. 3 The rule of law thus refers to the
regulation of the social order by the legal order.4 General Gage's com-
ments alluded to this fact by highlighting an eighteenth-century belief
that the "Law" was essential to the stability of the state and the preserva-
tion of law and order.
However, the power wielded by the rule of law is not absolute. Rather,
and herein lies the contradiction, it rests upon the appearance, not the
reality, of "equality before the law." By appearing to be just and removed
from gross manipulation, the rule of law commands voluntary compli-
ance from most sectors of civil society.5 Yet formal judicial equality, by
ignoring unequal class, gender and ethnic relations, perpetuates existing
socio-economic inequalities.6 In other words, the rule of law is fraught
with inconsistencies, thereby allowing it and "justice," as William Elenes
can attest, to be usurped. Given this, the question may be asked of the law,
both in the past and the present, "whose interests does it serve?"
The editors of Canadian State Trials, Volume I, address this tension
which exists within the rule of law. However, F. Murray Greenwood and
Barry Wright, along with the contributors to this volume, do not explain,
in the context of "state trials," how the contradictory nature of the rule of
law shaped the implementation and social meaning of justice. It is upon
this point concerning the rule of law that this review essay will focus to
critique Volume I of Canadian State Trials. This review will also assess
the overall themes of each article and the book itself to reveal the
importance of the subject of state trials to historians and legal scholars.
In addition, it will suggest some revisions, arising out of the difficulties
with this volume, that need to be seriously considered for future volumes.
This book is the first instalment in a planned six-volume project
dedicated to exploring state trials in Canada. Under the auspices of the
Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History and published in conjunc-
tion with the University of Toronto Press, this series will be indispensable
3. D. Sayer, The Violence ofAbstraction: The Analytic Foundations ofHistorical Materialism
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987) at 107-110; E.P. Thompson, The Poverty of Theory & Other
Essays (London: Merlin, 1978) at 96.
4. E. Colvin, "Criminal Law and the Rule of Law", in P. Fitzgerald, ed., Crime, Justice and
Codification: Essays in Commemoration of Jacques Fortin (Toronto: Carswell, 1986) at 127-
129.
5. Ibid. at 136; D. Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law", in D. Hay et al., eds.,
"'Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England (London: Penguin,
1975) at 33; E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origins of the Black Act (New York:
Pantheon, 1975) at 263.
6. A. Bartholomew & S. Boyd, "Toward a Political Economy of Law", in W. Clement & G.
Williams, eds., The New Canadian Political Economy (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University
Press, 1989) at 229.
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to any nuanced understanding of the legal, social and political history of
Canada. Volume I covers the period from the establishment of Qu6bec in
1608 to the onset of the rebellions in Upper and Lower Canada in 1837.
The state trials associated with these rebellions will be dealt with in
Volume II. An assortment of legal scholars, historians and archivists who
specialize in this era have written seventeen articles, arranged chrono-
logically, on specific state trials, the incidents which sparked them and
their legal ramifications.
The focus of this series, "state trials," is a broad, yet overlooked subject
in Canadian legal and social history. A "state trial," Greenwood and
Wright contend, may be generally defined as "any trial in which the
political interests of government were specifically ... engaged." This
can include issues such as national security, political corruption, federal/
provincial disputes over jurisdiction and native land claims. State trials
have also been held to determine the guilt or innocence of those persons
accused of committing offences against the state, whether of a political
nature or a threat to the security of the state. Moreover, state trials
underscore the power that the state can wield, for instance suspending
habeas corpus, in the pursuit of "justice."7 It is from these perspectives
that Canadian State Trials attempts to assess the character of the law and
politics in colonial British North America.
A unique and welcomed addition to this volume are the detailed
appendices. In the first two, Patricia Kennedy provides a common-sense
strategy for researching the history of state trials. She then outlines the
archival locations of the most pertinent manuscript collections.8 The third
appendix, "Supporting Documents", reproduces the relevant primary
document(s) for each chapter.9 This section conveys to readers the
historical richness of legal records and provides them with the opportu-
nity to compare the authors' conclusions with some of the sources of their
information; a rare privilege indeed.
Volume I of Canadian State Trials stands at the crossroads of three
fields of historical scholarship: legal, criminal justice and social. All three
have yet to reach an historiographical consensus on methodology and
relevancy. Legal and criminal justice history have recently established a
niche within Canadian historiography. With the publication in 1995 of
Law, Society and the State: Essays in Modem Legal History, legal
7. F.M. Greenwood & B. Wright, "Introduction: State Trials, the Rule of Law and Executive
Powers in Early Canada", in State Trials, supra note I at 10-11 [hereinafter "Introduction"].
8. P. Kennedy, "Approaching an Iceberg: Some Guidelines for Understanding Archival
Sources Relating to State Trials" and "Note on Sources" in State Trials, supra note I at 577-
595.
9. This appendix covers 136 pages of text. State Trials, supra note 1 at 596-732.
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history, once considered a marginal part of Canadian history, has, in the
words of David Sugarman, "come of age." 0 Legal history was character-
ized by narrowly focused examinations of the law, its development, and
the impact it had on specific individuals or institutions." This concentra-
tion tends to ignore the larger socio-economic milieu which impinges
upon the creation and interpretation of the law. Legal history is now
marked, in the view of Louis A. Knafla and Susan W.S. Binnie, by an
interest in how law and the state are informed by race, gender, class and
culture. ' 2
Where legal history has diverged from criminal justice history is the
importance it attributes to the history of crime. Some legal historians view
crime as a rather incidental element of the law and therefore give it little
attention. 3 Criminal justice history, however, tries to illustrate the
centrality of crime to the definition and functioning of the law. Some
social historians have turned their attention to crime and criminal justice
as a means of comprehending the organization of capitalist social
relations. Such themes as criminality, state formation, punishment and
incarceration, and police and law enforcement, form the parameters of
criminal justice history. '4 Much of the work in criminal justice history has
dealt with the nineteenth century. As a result, these issues are in need of
serious exploration in the context of the twentieth century. '5
Despite the advancements made by legal and criminal justice history,
most social historians continue to overlook the law. While there are
exceptions to this rule, notably the work of Karen Dubinsky, Tina Loo
and Carolyn Strange, in general the law and its various institutional and
social components are not perceived by most social historians in Canada
10. L.A. Knafla & S.W.S. Binnie, eds., Law, Society and the State: Essays in Modern Legal
History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995) at ix [hereinafter Law, Society and the
State].
11. For examples of this trend see D.H. Brown, The Genesis of the Canadian Criminal Code
of 1892 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989); and D.J. Bercuson & L.A. Knafla, eds.,
Law and Society in Canada in Historical Perspective (Calgary: The University of Calgary
Press, 1979).
12. Law, Society and the State, supra note 10 at 4. The most recent commentary on the state
of legal history in Canada is made by Jim Phillips in "Recent Publications in Canadian Legal
History" (1997) 78:2 Can. Hist. Rev. 236.
13. B. Young, "Law 'in the round' (1986) 16:1 Acadiensis 155 at 159-160; G. Marquis,
"Law, Society and History: Whose Frontier?" (1992) 21:2 Acadiensis 162 at 174.
14. Most of these themes are covered in J. Phillips, T. Loo & S. Lewthwaite, eds., Essays in
the History of Canadian Law vol. 5 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994).
15. This point is also made by J. Phillips, "Crime and Punishment in the Dominion of the
North: Canada from New France to the Present", in C. Emsley & L.A. Knafla, eds., Crime
History and Histories of Crime: Studies in the Historiography of Crime and Criminal Justice
in Modern History (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1996) at 180-181.
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to be integral to the course of Canadian history. 6 But they most certainly
are. The law, both criminal and civil, along with its formation, enforce-
ment and the opposition it generates, particulary crime, shapes class,
gender and ethnic relations and identities. Nevertheless, the law, in all its
historical dimensions, has not made a dramatic impact upon the writing
of Canadian history.
One of the main reasons for this are the shortcomings found in legal
and criminal justice histories. Both are relatively devoid of critical theory
and a broader socio-economic setting. The law impinges upon and serves
to legitimize capitalist society and its concomitant inequalities. More-
over, the rule of law, as a hegemonic ideology, is defined in part by
ongoing political, economic and cultural struggles, all of which are driven
by the individuals who engage in these conflicts. In failing to grapple with
these issues, legal and criminal justice history, regardless of their achieve-
ments, will remain marginalized within the realm of Canadian historiog-
raphy. 7 This is the dilemma facing the Canadian State Trials project.
Without engaging some of the larger questions associated with the law
and state trials, this and successive volumes will find it increasingly
difficult to exert their relevance beyond the confines of legal scholarship.
The Introduction to Volume I is the crux of this problem. "State Trials,
the Rule of Law and Executive Powers in Early Canada", co-authored by
F. Murray Greenwood and Barry Wright, provides an overview of the
main themes contained in this volume, specifically: how colonial courts
served as important political battlefields, the prominence of the law in
constitutional debate and social conflict, the interpretation and applica-
tion of the law, the notion ofjudicial independence, and how the language
of the British constitution and "British justice" permeated the social and
political landscape of British North American society. Greenwood and
Wright also stress that the Atlantic colonies are strongly represented in
this volume. With seven of the seventeen chapters devoted to the Atlantic
region, this volume acknowledges the importance of and makes a
significant contribution to the eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century
history of Atlantic Canada.
16. K. Dubinsky, Improper Advances: Rape and Heterosexual Conflict in Ontario, 1880-
1929 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993); T. Loo, Making Law, Order and
Authority in British Columbia, 1821-1871 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994); and
C. Strange & T. Loo, Making Good: Law and Moral Regulation in Canada, 1867-1939
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997).
17. While the historiography of the law, crime and criminal justice in Europe and the United
States has made greater strides in comparison to Canada, it is still, as Louis A. Knafla notes,
"relatively underwritten." L.A. Knafla, "Structure, Conjuncture and Event in the Historiogra-
phy of Modem Criminal Justice History" in C. Emsley & L.A. Knafla, eds., supra note 15 at
33 [hereinafter "Structure, Conjuncture and Event"].
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The editors try to come to terms with the meaning of "state trials" and
the thorny question of the reception of British law in the colonies. It is
here, however, where the Introduction is weakest. By employing an all-
inclusive definition of what constituted a "state trial", essentially any act
that could undermine state security and public order, the editors and
contributors have endeavoured to "highlight an ongoing tension between
the rule of law and the discretionary exercise of executive measures and
reveal something about the role of the law in the exercise of power."' 8
There are two serious drawbacks to this approach. Firstly, not every essay
comments directly on this tension or how the law was employed as a
symbol of state power. Whether or not the state trials examined in this
volume were acts of "justice" or repression is a fundamental point, which
is not made clear, about how British North Americans perceived the law
and its operation.
Secondly, the broadness of the definition of "state trials" complicates
rather than clarifies one's understanding of how the state and the law
worked during this period of Canadian history. If a state trial could be
convened for anything from military treason to seditious libel, the
assumption is that the state and the law were all-pervasive institutions
which acted in a rational and calculated fashion. Such, however, was not
the case, especially in the formative years of 1608 to 1837, for either the
state or the law. Instead, both functioned with a degree of relative
autonomy and often in a haphazard manner.19 This shortcoming is
compounded by the absence of a clear conceptualization of the "state"
itself. Without a sense of what and who comprised the "state" and how it
and the law changed from 1608 to 1837, the full impact that state trials had
upon the development of Canada's political and legal culture, as well as
thejustice system, is lost.20 If this problem is not resolved, future volumes
will be unable to properly assess the transformation that the state and the
law underwent with the rise of capitalist modernity.
Another contentious part of the Introduction is the lengthy discussion
of the reception of British law in each colony and its effect on colonial
law. Greenwood and Wright should be commended for broaching such
18. "Introduction", supra note 7 at 9.
19. For more on the relative autonomy of the state and the law see G. Albo & J. Jenson, "A
Contested Concept: The Relative Autonomy of the State", in W. Clement & G. Williams, eds.,
supra note 6 at 180-211.
20. The nature of the colonial state is discussed in A. Greer and I. Radforth, eds., Colonial
Leviathan: State Formation in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Canada (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1992). A useful historiographical commentary on nineteenth-century state
formation is P. Burroughs, "State Formation and the Imperial Factor in Nineteenth-Century
Canada" (1996) 24:1 J. Imperial & Commonwealth Hist. 118.
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a complex issue. Ironically, they fail to demonstrate the historical
importance of reception in relation to how state trials unfolded and the
general adminstration of the law in British North America. The exercise
of the criminal and civil law hinges upon external as well as internal
socio-economic factors.2' Hence the need to evaluate which version of the
law, English or French, the colonies adopted and how they modified it to
suit local circumstances. Unfortunately, this point is not fully developed
by Greenwood and Wright, leaving the centrality of reception undeter-
mined. Similarly, most of the essays do not mention the issue of reception.
Thus it must be assumed that reception was not a serious problem for
colonial administrations. While each chapter discusses many of the key
elements of state trials, as a whole Canadian State Trials is a disjointed
book due to its lack of a strong organizational framework.
The sheer breadth of some of the articles in this volume is evident in
the opening piece by Peter N. Moogk. "The Crime of L~se-Majest6 in
New France: Defense of the Secular and Religious Order" is a brief
statistical evaluation of state trials in New France and local forms of
resistance towards the imposition of order. In ancien rigime France,
crimes perpetrated against the state, "lse-Majestj humaine et divine",
also struck a blow at the Roman Catholic Church. French criminal law
viewed and protected the monarchy and the church as one institution.
Both stood at the apex of a sacred hierarchy of order, occupations and
individuals that the law enshrined. This class-based society formed the
backbone of the bonne ordre which magistrates and public officials
adhered to and enforced. As Moogk notes, this ethos figured prominently
in the social and legal discourse of New France as the colony struggled
to maintain a sense of social order.22
Without legal restraints, it was felt, society would erupt into anarchy.
This belief, as Moogk notes, sanctioned the sometimes swift and harsh
punishment meted out to offenders. As the eighteenth century dawned
lse-Majest consisted mainly of secular offences, including petty trea-
son and sedition. Residents of New France did not always passively
accept the iron will of the law. Opposition to public executions, hindering
legal officials in the course of their duties and a general defiance of
authority, what Moogk describes as "la rebellion a justice", characterized
legal and social relations in New France. This in turn prompted some
magistrates to hand out lenient sentences to calm the waters of protest and
ensure a semblance of legitimacy for thejustice system. While this article
21. "Structure, Conjuncture and Event", supra note 17 at 39.
22. P.N. Moogk, "The Crime of Lse-Majest6 in New France: Defence of the Secular and
Religious Order", in State Trials, supra note I at 55-71.
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does not deal with the precise workings of state trials, Moogk neverthe-
less underscores the dialectic relationship between the law and civil
society.
In comparison to Moogk's sweeping analysis, Barry Cahill's "The
'Hoffman Rebellion' (1753) and Hoffman's Trial (1754): Constructive
High Treason and Seditious Conspiracy in Nova Scotia under the
Stratocracy" is a more finite study of a single state trial. Cahill meticu-
lously reconstructs Hoffman's trial and eventual conviction for seditious
conspiracy. In what Cahill describes as a "gross miscarriage of justice",
the General Court fined Hoffman 100 pounds sterling, sentenced him to
two years imprisonment and then banished him from the colony."
Hoffman, one of the "Foreign Protestants" who came to Nova Scotia in
1753 and settled in Lunenburg, was arrested as the ringleader of a putsch
initiated in 1753 by German settlers angered by a rumour that supplies
destined for their settlement had been waylaid at Halifax.
Hoffman first faced a charge of treason. But when the grand jury, in a
show of protest over state policy and corruption, overturned the charge,
the government ordered that a charge of seditious conspiracy be laid
against Hoffman. Cahill's article deftly shows that the ideal of judicial
independence in colonial Nova Scotia remained just that, an ideal.
Moreover, the Hoffman trial sheds further light on the political animosi-
ties between the Halifax oligarchy and those groups within the province
opposed to what they saw as centralized, autocratic rule by the govern-
ment. What Cahill's work does not address, however, is the wider socio-
economic context and the religious turmoil involving "churchmen" and
"dissenters" which helped to mould political and legal decisions in Nova
Scotia. In the absence of this background, the Hoffman case, while
important, still seems to be an isolated incident in the larger scheme of
Atlantic Canadian legal and social history.
Thomas Garden Barnes' "'Twelve Apostles' or a Dozen Traitors?
Acadian Collaborators during King George's War, 1744-8", is akin to
Cahill's "Hoffman Rebellion" in that it too makes some salient points
about the nature of politics and the law in Acadia. This article adds a new
dimension to the history of the Acadian deportation. In the years imme-
diately preceding the expulsion of the Acadians in 1755, Major Paul
Mascarene, the surrogate governor of Nova Scotia (1739-1749), felt
convinced that if treated fairly the Acadians would have no cause to rebel
23. B. Cahill, "The 'Hoffman Rebellion' (1753) and Hoffman's Trial (1754): Constructive
High Treason and Seditious Conspiracy in Nova Scotia under the Stratocracy", in State Trials,
supra note I at 72-97.
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against the English. This outlook was put into practice when twelve
Acadians, tried for collaborating with French invaders during the course
of King George's War, did not hang for their crime. By not bringing the
full force of the law to bear upon these twelve "traitors", Barnes argues,
Mascarene and the Executive Council reaffirmed the legitimacy of
English law and British control over the colony. It also kept the Acadians,
albeit unofficially, neutral.2 4
This article pinpoints some of the difficulties imperial authorities had
implementing the law in a colonial milieu. Mascarene seemed well aware
of the problems he faced trying to apprehend all of the potential Acadian
"traitors" and sorting through the logistics of their trials. Almost as a
compromise Mascarene refused to execute the guilty parties, thereby
evoking the leniency of British law. However, under the governorship of
Charles Lawrence (1753-1760), the rules of the game changed. As Barnes
contends, the rule of law and the preservation of peace, order and good
government meant but one thing to Lawrence vis-a-vis the Acadians:
expulsion. This point should not be ignored by those historians concerned
with evaluating the legal and political justifications for expelling the
Acadians. Barnes could have gone one step further and depicted
Lawrence's actions as a product of what F. Murray Greenwood, in
relation to Lower Canada, has called a "garrison mentality. '25 From this
perspective, the Acadians fell victim to a rigid interpretation and strict
enforcement of the law.
"Civilians Tried in Military Courts: Quebec, 1759-64", by Douglas
Hay, investigates similar examples of ad hoc justice. In the interim
between the downfall of Qu6bec and the solidification of the British state,
military courts served as the only medium for formally dispensing
criminaljustice. Hay has unearthed approximately fifty cases of civilians
tried before these courts for criminal wrongdoing in this six-year time
span. According to the letter of the law civilians could not be subjected
to military law. Yet as Hay skilfully demonstrates, this fact was ignored
or given little credence by local officials due to the unsettled nature of
civilian justice in Quebec.26 This judicial practice generated a storm of
24. T.G. Barnes, "'Twelve Apostles' or a Dozen Traitors? Acadian Collaborators during
King George's War, 1744-8", in State Trials, supra note I at 98-113.
25. F.M. Greenwood, "Judges and Treason Law in Lower Canada, England and the United
States during the French Revolution, 1794-1800", in State Trials, supra note 1 at 241-295
[hereinafter "Judges and Treason Law"]. For an insightful critique of the "garrison mentality"
thesis see P. Burroughs, "'The Garrison Mentality' versus 'La Survivance': English-French
Relations in Lower Canada, 1791-1838" (1996) 24:2 J. Imperial & Commonwealth Hist. 296.
26. Douglas Hay, "Civilians Tried in Military Courts: Quebec, 1759-64", in State Trials,
supra note I at 114-128.
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controversy amongst those Montreal merchants tried for insulting army
officers. In effect, "British justice", the right to a fair and impartial trial,
had been sacrificed in the name of social order and military honour.2 1
By their very nature, these courts, in Hay's words, "raised political
passions in Quebec" and trampled civil liberties. Illegal arrests and
denying some prisoners the right to bail were a few of the alleged
injustices carried out by Qu6bec's military courts. In Hay's estimation
these courts became a focal point of debate over civilian and military
notions of justice and freedom. The question of who represented the
"civilian" side of this equation is problematic. Did the two women in the
case files, a "negro woman" and a "negro slave", in addition to the French
civilians brought before the military courts, receive the same or worse
treatment as the English merchants portrayed by Hay? The class, gender
and ethnicity of the accused could indeed have altered the extent and
meaning of judicial tyranny in the military courts of post-Conquest
Quebec.
Jean-Marie Fecteau and Douglas Hay continue this theme of military
(in)justice in "'Government by Will and Pleasure Instead of Law':
Military Justice and the Legal System in Qu6bec, 1775-83." Constitu-
tionally, two treasured elements of British liberty were trial by jury and
habeas corpus. Many residents of Quebec did not believe that these
fundamental rights were in effect in the colony. In response, a binational
alliance emerged which demanded that all citizens of Quebec be granted
the constitutional protection enjoyed by English persons. The British did
institute habeas corpus for criminal cases in Quebec in 1764 and for civil
cases in 1785. These measures and the entire British legal system existed
alongside, and in conflict with, French civil law. 8 Fecteau and Hay hint
at the distemper and potential for unity that this situation caused, but they
do not fully explore the social and ethnic friction reflected in and created
by these competing institutions.
The outbreak of the American Revolution and the fears it stirred
amongst British military rulers shattered the fragile veneer of "British
justice." As Fecteau and Hay note, the wrongful imprisonment of at least
twenty-five men for suspected treason is indicative of the fact that justice
and constitutional rights could easily be suspended by imperial authori-
27. The concept of "British justice" is best explained by G. Marquis, "Doing Justice to
'British Justice': Law, Ideology and Canadian Historiography", in W.W. Pue and B. Wright,
eds., Canadian Perspectives on Law and Society: Issues in Legal History (Ottawa: Carleton
University Press, 1988) at 43-69.
28. For more on the tensions between these two distinct national legal systems see E. Kolish,
"Some Aspects of Civil Litigation in Lower Canada, 1785-1825: Towards the Use of Court
Records for Canadian Social History" (1989) 70:3 Can. Hist. Rev. 337.
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ties bent on preserving order and loyalty in the midst of war.29 Fecteau and
Hay trace the treatment accorded four of the twenty-five men appre-
hended by the British army. Fleury Mesplet, Valentin Jautard, Charles
Hay and Pierre Du Calvet were held against their will, denied bail, never
formally charged or tried for their alleged crimes and released only after
the war with the Thirteen Colonies ended. Such actions on the part of the
state, as Fecteau and Hay aptly show, fostered a critique of the use of
executive powers which in turn laid some of the groundwork for future
political reform movements in Lower Canada. It also circulated doubts
about the hegemonic stability of English freedom and constitutionality in
Quebec. While these are seminal conclusions, the fact that an actual state
trial does not appear in this article reinforces the need for the editors to
have precisely identified the criteria for state trials.
State repression in a climate of military confrontation is echoed by
Ernest A. Clarke and Jim Phillips in "Rebellion and Repression in Nova
Scotia in the Era of the American Revolution." The government of Nova
Scotia employed a number of informal strategies to curb rebellious
sentiment in the colony. Confiscation or destruction of property and
seizure of cattle, while resorted to by the state in only a few cases, still sent
a message, Clarke and Phillips maintain, to would-be rebels to remain
loyal to the British Crown or suffer the consequences. The Eddy Rebel-
lion of 1776 and the subsequent seige of Fort Cumberland by a band of
"Yankee rebels", serves as the backdrop to Clarke and Phillips' study of
colonial law in action. After the dust had settled and the British had foiled
the rebels' plans to take control of the fort, the government had to deal
with those residents suspected of sympathizing with the Americans.
The authorities adopted a two-pronged approach to settling this matter.
Firstly, they tried and convicted two men for high treason. This, accord-
ing to Clarke and Phillips, allowed the state to demonstrate its resolve to
protect the colony, a mind-set reminiscent of a "garrison mentality."
Moreover, with mistrust over the colony's oligarchic government wide-
spread within the province, provincial officials had to display a measure
of tolerance and their faith in the general populace that they would stay
true to the British flag. Secondly, in what Clarke and Phillips call the
"privatization of repression", the government supported the civil actions
launched by Loyalists to seek compensation for the losses they had
29. J. Fecteau & D. Hay, "'Government by Will and Pleasure Instead of Law': Military
Justice and the Legal System in Qudbec, 1775-83", in State Trials, supra note I at 129-171.
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suffered during the rebellion.3" In so doing, the colonial government had
moved the fight against its political enemies into the judicial arena.
"Rebellion and Repression in Nova Scotia in the Era of the American
Revolution" is a vital addition to the debate surrounding Nova Scotia's
"neutrality" during the American war for independence and the varied
meanings of "loyalty." Similarly, while highlighting the paradox of the
rule of law in this context and how it informed the government's
decisions, Clarke and Phillips do not comment upon the social and class
conflict in the colony and its bearing upon the implementation of the law
for political gain and social power.
D.G. Bell's "Sedition among the Loyalists: The Case of Saint John,
1784-6" provides another example of how the law and loyalty were used
to extinguish dissent. New Brunswick's governing elite included state
trials in their strategy to intimidate their political opponents. In 1786 the
government passed a statute restricting political petitioning. This cur-
tailed public debate and limited many citizens' access to the political
process. A few, however, chose to protest this apparent outrage. Two
printers (William Lewis and John Ryan), along with four others who
signed a petition in opposition to this law, went on trial for seditious libel.
The court convicted and fined all six men. The loyalty cry, as a hegemonic
device, in Bell's assessment, gave the government carte blanche to deal
with those who challenged its authority.3 Bell's article adds further
weight to the argument that the Loyalist leadership in New Brunswick
was not a united body, but rather one riddled with internal rivalries.
Missing from Bell's discussion is an assessment of how this use of state
repression in Saint John may have formed the basis of future political
reform movements, particularly at a time when Saint John was still in the
initial stages of socio-economic and political evolution.
Elite fear of popular anarchy and disloyalty thrived within the minds
of many prominent Englishmen in Lower Canada. F. Murray Greenwood's
"Judges and Treason Law in Lower Canada, England and the United
States during the French Revolution, 1794-1800" formulates the idea of
a "garrison mentality." Greenwood points out that paranoia among the
English bourgeoisie in Lower Canada over internal security peaked at the
time of the French Revolution. One way to expose this attitude is to
30. E.A. Clarke & J. Phillips, "Rebellion and Repression in Nova Scotia in the Era of the
American Revolution", in State Trials, supra note 1 at 172-220. This article is part of a larger
study by E.A. Clarke, The Seige of Fort Cumberland 1776: An Episode in the American
Revolution (Kingston & Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995).
31. D.G. Bell, "Sedition among the Loyalists: The Case of Saint John, 1784-6", in State
Trials, supra note I at 223-240.
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scrutinize, as Greenwood does, judicial behaviour in treason trials.
Greenwood also provides a concise history of treason law in Lower
Canada, England and the United States, as well as a window into the
differing judicial practices and legal traditions in each country. As
Greenwood astutely observes, by interpreting and evaluating the cases
before them, judges construed, if not constructed, the substantive law,
often with profound results.
This article delineates two ideological perspectives from which to
consider judicial decisions: "Baconian" and "Cokean." The former
approach sided with the views of the executive power in spite of the law,
while the latter upheld the law despite the wishes of the government. In
the case of Lower Canada, Greenwood argues, a "Baconian" attitude,
rooted as it was in the garrison mentality, dominated judicial discourse.3 2
Unlike American and British judges, upon whom the French Revolution
had a liberalizing affect, judges in Lower Canada, Greenwood believes,
took a more authoritarian stance towards suspected traitors. Judicial
independence, therefore, did not exist in Lower Canada. Exciting conclu-
sions indeed, but Greenwood does not venture beyond this to determine
the broader social and political consequences of these judges' decisions
and their legacy for Quebec's legal system.
In contrast to the formalized legal proceedings of Lower Canada,
Christopher English delves into the "official mind" in colonial New-
foundland and how it reacted to popular protest in a similar revolutionary
atmosphere. "The Official Mind and Popular Protest in a Revolutionary
Era: The Case of Newfoundland, 1789-1819" is a finely crafted piece of
scholarship. English has produced a intricately woven tapestry of colo-
nial Newfoundland history which draws upon ethnic and class conflict
and the inner workings of a justice system that was in a constant state of
flux. Newfoundland courts had at their disposal thejurisdiction of British
courts and the authority of English law. But as this chapter reveals, local
needs often dictated when and how these powers were used. Thus in one
sense the actual reception of British law did not prove to be a defining
moment in the legal history of Newfoundland. It is subtle points such as
this that the discussion of the historical relevance of reception, as found
in the Introduction to this volume, must consider.
32. "Judges and Treason Law", supra note 25. For a more in-depth look at this issue and
security measures in general in Quebec during the French Revolution see F.M. Greenwood,
Legacies of Fear: Law and Politics in Quibec in the Era of the French Revolution (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1993).
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What English has uncovered in Newfoundland from 1789 to 1819, is
the law before the "law." A limited policing power, coupled with the
unavailability of a state prosecutor-the result of the constitutional limbo
Newfoundland often found itself in-meant that private prosecutions
may have been the norm. Moreover, the undeveloped nature of govern-
mental and societal institutions gave state officials a tremendous amount
of unhindered power which they did not hesitate to use. Occasionally,
English states, this unmitigated use of state power had deadly conse-
quences. Military mutiny, a byproduct of the colony's uneasy shift from
being a migratory outpost for Britain's fishery to a permanent settlement,
was, in the "official mind"-a nebulous concept that clouds the argu-
ment-tantamount to treason. This resulted in treason trials and the
execution of at least five mutineers. 33
A form of communal regulation helped to keep Newfoundland from
imploding. A night-watch, supplemented by British soldiers, and com-
munity self-help, especially when food supplies ran low and widespread
hunger struck the colony, prevented rival Irish and British factions from
turning against one another or toppling the government. However, this
local conception of order and justice, a theme which Canadian State
Trials needs to stress, could work to the advantage or disadvantage of the
disempowered, as is evident in the William Elenes case which opens this
review.34 English's creative use of evidence and insightful analysis make
this a superb article.
Jean-Marie Fecteau, F. Murray Greenwood and Jean-Pierre Wallot
shift the focus back to Lower Canada and the "reign of terror" which
besieged the colony and its justice system. "Sir James Craig's 'Reign of
Terror' and Its Impact on Emergency Powers in Lower Canada, 1810-13"
illuminates the constant battle between the French and the English for
legal, social and political supremacy in Lower Canada. Governor Craig
and officials of his kind in Lower Canada, foreshadowing Lord Durham,
wanted to re-make the colony into a full-fledged British state. As a
corollary to this, Craig believed that for their own benefit, all French-
Canadien residents would have to be assimilated. Otherwise, so Craig
felt, the French-Canadien "lower orders" would heed France's call to
arms in an attack upon the colony which seemed to many to be imminent.
To avoid this Craig used the legal authority of his office to clamp down
on dissidents. For instance, Craig unlawfully imprisoned members of the
33. C. English, "The Official Mind and Popular Protest in a Revolutionary Era: The Case of
Newfoundland, 1789-1819", in State Trials, supra note I at 296-322.
34. Louis A. Knafla has argued that there are two levels or concepts of order: the nation-state
and the local community. See "Structure, Conjuncture and Event", supra note 17 at 39.
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Parti Canadien for seditious libel. Craig's replacement, Sir George
Prevost (1811-1815), followed in his footsteps. If the situation warranted,
Prevost was prepared to declare martial law without the consent of the
legislature. For much of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century,
moreover, habeas corpus was suspended. At times this occurred in
conjunction with the implementation of martial law. As the authors
declare, these practices amounted to an abuse of state powers intended
only for use when the judicial system collapsed, something that did not
happen in Lower Canada while Craig or Prevost held office. 35 This affront
to "British justice" symbolizes the repressive nature of the colonial state.
Similarly, it is something that both this article and the entire volume does
not utilize to its fullest extent in terms of underlining the competing
interpretations, often based on nationalist fervour and ethnic conflict, of
justice and order in British North America.
Attacks on civil rights were not confined to Lower Canada. Paul
Romney and Barry Wright's "State Trials and Security Proceedings in
Upper Canada during the War of 1812" skilfully shows that the law
became an interwoven part of social relations and subjected most citizens
to the dictates of its mercy. In what is a common theme in this collection,
the Upper Canadian government resorted to the expropriation of estates,
the cancellation of habeas corpus and treason trials to dispose of those
disloyal elements of society (usually Americans) and preserve loyalty
amongst the remainder of the population.36 The deaths of eight men for
treason at the hands of the state underscores not only the potency of the
law, embodied in the Sedition Act37 of 1804, but also the leverage enjoyed
by the legislature to regulate civil liberties. The ability of the law and the
state to individualize people and define who is "loyal" or a "criminal,"
thereby projecting the artificial notion of equality in society, is a central
ingredient of the rule of law's legitimacy.38 Romney and Wright, how-
ever, do not discuss what, if any, influence this fact may have had on
maintaining the sanctity of the government and the justice system within
Upper Canadian society.
"Parliamentary Privilege and the Repression of Dissent in the Canadas"
by F. Murray Greenwood and Barry Wright extends the point about state
35. J. Fecteau, F.M. Greenwood & J. Wallot, "Sir James Craig's 'Reign of Terror' and Its
Impact on Emergency Powers in Lower Canada, 1 810-13", in State Trials, supra note I at 323-
378.
36. P. Romney & B. Wright, "State Trials and Secutity Proceedings in Upper Canada during
the War of 1812", in State Trials, supra note I at 379-405.
37. 44 Geo. III, c. I (U.C.).
38. This point is drawn in part from M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the
Prison (New York: Vintage Books, 1979) at 89-90 and 99.
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repression into the c. 1814 to 1837 period. The authors emphasize that the
use of the law for the purposes of security is not confined to the wording
of legislation. Socio-economic and political interests often weigh heavily
in decisions to arrest or prosecute a suspect. As well, how the law itself
is interpreted can determine whether or not someone, by virtue of their
words or deeds, has broken the spirit if not the letter of the law. In Upper
and Lower Canada, outspoken politicians and newspaper editors came
into direct confrontation with the state. William Lyon Mackenzie was
expelled four different times from the Upper Canadian House of Assem-
bly for his supposedly subversive views. And each time his constituents
re-elected him. By relying upon its parliamentary privilege to eject
Mackenzie, the government had exceeded the legal boundaries of its
authority.
In Lower Canada the House imprisoned without trial newspaper
editors Ludger Duvernay and Daniel Tracey for libel. The government
also denied them their right to counsel. According to Greenwood and
Wright, this case provoked some of the first serious discussions within
patriot circles of political independence and the possible need for rebel-
lion to achieve this goal.3 9 These incidents, Greenwood and Wright
perceptively argue, exposed the partisan extremes to which colonial
governments were willing to go to guarantee domestic security and
silence opposition. But what this chapter does not examine is the local
context. In returning Mackenzie to office, some residents of Upper
Canada resoundingly denounced the government's actions and expressed
their general hostility towards corrupt politicians and their undemocratic
use of the law. In Lower Canada, the Duvernay/Tracey affair may have
been a watershed moment in the coming of the 1837 rebellion, but the fire
it ignited had already been smouldering in the colony as the French and
English vied for dominance. It was within this setting that the formal and
informal law and the power of the state operated in the Canadas and which
must serve as the basis for any analysis of this subject and period.
Political misuse of the law and the battleground the legal system
represented for the French and the English in Lower Canada comes to
light in Evelyn Kolish and James Lambert's "The Attempted Impeach-
ment of Lower Canadian Chief Justices, 1814-15." Judicio-cultural
differences, political conflict and ethnic tensions, Kolish and Lambert
cogently surmise, had a profound impact on the administration ofjustice.
39. F.M. Greenwood & B. Wright, "Parliamentary Privilege and the Repression of Dissent
in the Canadas", in State Trials, supra note I at 409-449.
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The attempted impeachment of Chief Justices Jonathan Sewell and James
Monk arose from this cauldron of mistrust. In addition, by singling out
these two judges, reformers hoped to strike a critical blow against the
colony's executive power. One of the primary issues in the impeachment
charge centred on the allegation that Sewell and Monk had used British
rules of practice to amend civil procedure and thus usurped the role of the
Lower Canadian legislature. In short, Sewell and Monk were accused of
partisan interference in the workings of colonial government.
Both men, echoing the feelings of Governor Craig, saw their actions
as a necessary step in the eventual Anglicization of Canadien institutions.
Kolish and Lambert indicate that the impeachment proceedings were
politically motivated.4 ° Moreover, and this is something Kolish and
Lambert do not address, these legal wranglings formed an integral part of
Lower Canadian political culture. Once the controversy had been fought
out in Lower Canada, imperial authorities dismissed the charges against
Sewell and Monk. But even in defeat, lessons had been learned on both
sides. Contemporaries quickly realized that the law and the judiciary
played an important role in the colony's political and constitutional
battles. Indeed, for the British, as Kolish and Lambert conclude, the
judiciary could not be compromised in any way if they hoped to preserve
their political, legal and social ascendency. For the French, this failed
attempt at impeachment reinforced their belief that political reform must
first be achieved before meaningful legal reform could occur.
The call for political reform in Upper Canada was also closely tied to
debates over the colonial law and system of justice. "The Gourlay Affair:
Seditious Libel and the Sedition Act in Upper Canada, 1818-19" by Barry
Wright, retraces the state's efforts to silence Robert Gourlay and his
measured attacks on what he held to be corrupt and unconstitutional
practices on the part of the government. Twice Gourlay was put on trial
for seditious libel and twice juries found him innocent. Nevertheless, the
Executive Council considered Gourlay to be a seditious alien and ordered
him deported. Gourlay defied the order, was thrown in jail and refused
bail. Gourlay waited behind bars for eight months before being brought
to trial. A stacked jury found him guilty of ignoring the deportation order
and Chief Justice Powell instructed Gourlay to leave Upper Canada at
once or face a capital charge. Gourlay obliged, but never conceded his
guilt and vowed to seek vindication. Wright's article adds a missing piece
to the pre- 1837 rebellion puzzle in Upper Canada by noting that Gourlay' s
40. E. Kolish and J. Lambert, "The Attempted Impeachment of the Lower Canadian Chief
Justices, 1814-15", in State Trials, supra note 1 at 450-486.
292 The Dalhousie Law Journal
mistreatment "set off a resurgent opposition movement" in the colony.4
"The Gourlay Affair", moreover, is a fascinating look at the political and
legal culture of Upper Canada. But the actual power exercised by the state
in terms of being able to manipulate the law (Seditious Meetings Act,4 2
1818), to its own advantage and what that meant for the perceived
legitimacy of the government and the judiciary needed to be more fully
addressed by Wright.
Paul Romney's "Upper Canada in the 1820s: Criminal Prosecution
and the Case of Francis Collins" picks up where Wright's study ends.
Following Gourlay' s forced exile, the administration of justice in Upper
Canada, Romney maintains, became the subject of intense political
discontent. Romney uses the libel trial of journalist Francis Collins to
illustrate two fundamental points about the law and justice in Upper
Canada. First, free speech, which articles by Wright, Bumsted and Cahill
also underline, was an embattled and fragile concept during the early
decades of the nineteenth century. The law of libel in Upper Canada
discountenanced any "calumny and abuse" of the state. Detractors of the
law countered that it permitted "calumny and abuse" towards opponents
of the government, but refused them the right to reply in kind. Collins, if
not Gourlay, was, it seems, victimized by discretionary readings of the
laws of libel and sedition for the sake of justice and political expediency.
Secondly, "justice" in Upper Canada, and by extension in Lower
Canada and the Atlantic colonies, had multiple meanings. The severe
punishment given to Collins (one year in prison and a fine of fifty
pounds), which Romney sees as "blatantly repressive" and "vindictive,"
pointed out to critics of the government the fate that awaited them if they
persisted in publicly airing their grievances. 43 While in one sense "jus-
tice" had been served with Collins' conviction, the neutrality and impar-
tially of the law had been breached. Indeed, with the colony's Attorney-
General conducting most of the criminal prosecutions for the Crown, the
"public interest" often became, as Romney states, sacrificed to the
personal interests and designs of the governing elite. Romney stops short,
however, of analyzing the class conflict engendered by this case and how
it determined some of the actions taken against Collins and the outcome
of his trial.
41. B. Wright, "The Gourlay Affair: Seditious Libel and the Sedition Act in Upper Canada,
1818-19", in State Trials, supra note 1 at 487-504.
42. 58 Geo. III, c. 11 (U.C.)
43. P. Romney, "Upper Canada in the 1820s: Criminal Prosecution and the Case of Francis
Collins", in State Trials, supra note I at 505-521.
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"Liberty of the Press in Early Prince Edward Island, 1823-9", by J.M.
Bumsted, touches upon the related theme of the public interest and
political tampering with legal procedures. As Bumsted indicates, the law
concerning libel and contempt remained unclear until 1843 when Britain
passed a statute which allowed truth to be used as a defense in such court
actions. Subsequently, no two libel trials, or at least the prominent ones,
were alike in British North America. With this need to explore legal
peculiarities in mind, Bumsted turns his attention to the 1823 and 1829
libel trials of James Douglas Haszard, editor of the Prince EdwardIsland
Register. Both cases revolved around the right of a newspaper editor to
reprint verbatim, and without editorial comment, such public proceed-
ings as debates from the House of Assembly or transcripts from court
cases. This stood in direct opposition to most other libel cases after 1820
which had as their legal focus the editorial commentary, not the proceed-
ings themselves.
The injured parties, acting on their own accord, mounted each of the
prosecutions against Haszard. These cases were precedent setting and
indicative of some of the interesting legal practices on Prince Edward
Island. The first case (Lane v. Haszard), was the only one of its kind in
British North America to be heard in a Chancery Court. The Island's
Lieutenant Governor, Charles D. Smith (1812-1824), used the Chancery
Court for his own personal gain and to counter the influence of the
Supreme Court which he felt thwarted justice. 44 In the second case
(Palmerv. Haszard), the jury found the accused guilty and recommended
damages in the amount of "ONE SHILLING." In reaching this decision
the jury, according to Bumsted, exercised a significant principle with
regards to the liberty of the press, namely that a jury was ultimately
responsible for determining the law and fact in libel cases. Henceforth,
newspaper editors could in theory be protected from unlawful prosecu-
tion. The impact that the decisions in these cases had on pre-1837 Island
politics and the evolution of democracy in Prince Edward Island or across
the colonies does not, regrettably, appear in Bumsted's conclusions.
Joseph Howe would later benefit from the precedent set by Palmer v.
Haszard. In the last article in Canadian State Trials, Barry Cahill's "R.
v. Howe (1835) for Seditious Libel: A Tale of Twelve Magistrates", takes
a sober second look at this infamous trial. Nova Scotia, unlike Upper
Canada or Britain, never turned to the legal sanctions of the Sedition Act
to quell political discord. The province instead relied upon the common
law to repress foes such as Joseph Howe. When Howe came before the
44. J.M. Burnsted, "Liberty of the Press in Early Prince Edward Island, 1823-9", in State
Trials, supra note 1 at 522-546.
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Nova Scotia magistrates, in what Cahill calls a "show trial", to answer to
the charge of libel, no perceived difference existed, legal or otherwise,
between sedition and the defamation of public officials. This was, for all
intents and purposes, a political trial and a concerted assault on Nova
Scotia's political reform movement.45
R. v. Howe epitomizes the essence of state trials. As Cahill asserts, this
trial had nothing to do with the proper administration of criminal justice.
Rather, this case was about "official repression and prescribing the outer
limits of political dissent." Howe's trial displayed one of the central
functions of the rule of law: to preserve the appearance of law and order.
Howe's acquittal de-criminalized libel in Nova Scotia. Thereafter, or at
least until J.B. McLachlan in 1923, all political libel cases were private,
not public prosecutions. While Cahill's article may not celebrate the
outcome of Howe's trial as a triumph of justice and a victory for
democracy and freedom of the press in Nova Scotia, since in many ways
it was none of these, it does suggest how state trials represented an abuse
of political and judicial power by the government. Where the article
falters is in its neglect of the larger context of class and political
antagonisms in Nova Scotia that bore directly on the decision to try and
acquit Joseph Howe.
The Canadian State Trials series is in a position to move into the
forefront of legal and criminal justice history in Canada. As these
historiographical fields continue to evolve, the State Trials project can
serve as a forum to showcase the work of legal, criminal justice and social
historians. Before this can happen, however, the problems contained in
Volume I, as detailed in this review essay, must be overcome. Most
importantly, greater attention to socio-economic context, as evident in
the chapter by Christopher English, together with a more sophisticated
theoretical discussion of the rule of the law and the state, would have
strengthened many of the articles in this volume. This same approach will
provide a stable foundation upon which subsequent volumes can build
and expand their arguments. As well, a refined definition of what a "state
trial" is and the legal issues and arguments surrounding it, would have
added clarity to Volume I and solidified the historical relevance of some
of the cases contained therein. With this fine-tuning in place, Canadian
State Trials will be better able to explore the intricacies of the law, how
it shaped and was shaped by social relations, and its influence on the
social, economic and political development of Canada.
45. This case was also the first and only public libel prosecution against a newspaper in Nova
Scotia's history. B. Cahill, "R. v. Howe (1835) for Seditious Libel: A Tale of Twelve
Magistrates", in State Trials, supra note 1 at 547-575.
